authenticatedparameter to "yes", effectively bypassing authentication.
isAdminis perfectly normal.
zxcvbnin the browser console, to get back detailed information about how likely it is to crack the password including a score.
http GET https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/A94A8
FE5CC...part of the returned list?). If it is not part of the returned list, then the password for the given hash has not been found. Otherwise, as in case of
FE5CC..., it will return a counter showing how many times it has been found in breaches (e.g.:
/usr/share/wordlistson Kali Linux.
jti(JWT ID) claim, which gives the JWT a unique identifier.
algattribute in the token header, then delete
HS256, set it to
none, and use an empty signature (e.g., signature = ""). Use this token and replay it in a request. Some libraries treat tokens signed with the none algorithm as a valid token with a verified signature. This allows attackers to create their own "signed" tokens.
identifierForVendor, which is related to the bundle ID: the moment you change a bundle ID, the method will return a different value. When the app is ran for the first time, make sure you store the value returned by
identifierForVendorto the KeyChain, so that changes to it can be detected at an early stage.
Settings.Secure.ANDROID_IDtill Android 8.0 (API level 26) to identify an application instance. Note that starting at Android 8.0 (API level 26),
ANDROID_IDis no longer a device unique ID. Instead, it becomes scoped by the combination of app signing key, user and device. So validating
ANDROID_IDfor device blocking could be tricky for these Android versions. Because if an app changes its signing key, the
ANDROID_IDwill change and it won't be able to recognize old users devices. Therefore, it's better to store the
ANDROID_IDencrypted and privately in a private a shared preferences file using a randomly generated key from the
AndroidKeyStoreand preferably AES_GCM encryption. The moment the app signature changes, the application can check for a delta and register the new
ANDROID_ID. The moment this new ID changes without a new application signing key, it should indicate that something else is wrong. Next, the device binding can be extended by signing requests with a key stored in the
Keychainfor iOS and in the
KeyStorein Android can reassure strong device binding. You should also test if using different IPs, different locations and/or different time-slots will trigger the right type of information in all scenarios.